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Executive summary 
‘No win no fee’ arrangements are becoming increasingly common 
in employment tribunal cases. However little is known about the 
factors underlying the choice of such arrangements. In general 
three sets of potential influences are at work. These are the 
characteristics and circumstances of claimants, the willingness of 
legal advisers to enter into such arrangements and the type of case 
involved. 
Secondary analysis of the Survey of Employment Tribunals (SETA) 
2003 data found there was no statistical difference in the levels of 
satisfaction with case outcome expressed between those claimants 
represented on contingent fee arrangements and those who did not 
have such an arrangement. Claimants with contingent fee 
arrangements were involved in higher financial value cases and 
were more likely to be seeking compensation than claimants with 
other fee arrangements.  They were also more likely to be advised 
that they were likely to win their claim than those with other fee 
arrangements.  The most significant factors at play in the choice of 
fee arrangements are the jurisdiction and outcome of the case, the 
amount of money involved and the financial circumstances of the 
claimant. 
 
Aims and objectives 
This research aims to explore the relationship between the choice and use of 
legal advice and representation by claimants in employment tribunals and their 
case outcomes and levels of satisfaction with outcomes.   
A predominantly exploratory methodology was employed rather than one 
concentrating on the testing of precisely formulated hypotheses. In particular 
the work does not attempt to identify causal relationships or build or test 
theories which attempt to explain choices of representation at employment 
tribunals. Instead factors which are common in contingent fee situations are 
identified and these would be the key variables to take into account in any 
explanation of the choice processes which lead to contingent fee arrangements 
with legal advisers. 
Background 
The stimulus for the research was the concern voiced by members of tribunals, 
the Law Society, the academic community and others at the spread and quality 
of ‘no win no fee’ advice and representation in employment tribunal cases. The 
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research aimed to explore factors that affect the adoption of contingent fee 
arrangements at employment tribunals. 
Main findings 
• There is no statistical difference in the levels of satisfaction with case 
outcome expressed between those claimants represented on contingent 
fee arrangements and those who did not have such an arrangement.   
• Claimants who were covered by legal expenses insurance and/or 
members of a trade union were less likely have contingent fee 
arrangements.   
• Claimants with contingent fee arrangements were involved in higher 
financial value cases and were more likely to be seeking compensation 
than claimants with other fee arrangements.  
• Claimants with contingent fee arrangements were more likely to be 
advised that they were likely to win their claim than those with other fee 
arrangements.  Tribunal hearing outcomes suggest that this optimism 
might be misplaced. Claimants with contingent fee arrangements were 
successful in 48% of cases compared to 56% where normal fee 
arrangements applied and 56% of all cases (any representation). Note 
also here the tendency for contingent fee arrangements to be used in 
higher financial value cases. 
• Cases where a contingent fee arrangement existed were more likely to be 
settled and less likely to be withdrawn.  Those cases involving contingent 
fees were less likely to be ACAS conciliated but twice as likely to be 
privately settled.  
• Large settlements (those over £5,000) were more a feature of contingent 
fee cases compared to other settled cases. 
• Contingent fee payers also have higher salaries on average and more 
likely to be managers than non-contingent fee payers. 
• Claimants entering into contingent fee arrangements do not seem to be 
responding to cold-calling by persons offering legal representation 
services when compared to those entering other arrangements with 
lawyers  
• Claimants who eventually enter into contingent fee arrangements are just 
as likely to have been contacted by Acas and equally aware of their right 
to some free preliminary advice as claimants in general. 
• A multi-variable cluster analysis of the SETA 2003 data suggests that 
contingent fee claimants had higher than average salaries, had some 
higher education qualifications, and financial settlements were a the top 
end of the range reported in SETA 2003. 
• There is evidence to suggest that claimants with contingent fee 
arrangements who settled their case or who rejected an offer of 
settlement, are more inclined to feel they would have done better at a 
Tribunal hearing. 
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1 
Sources of legal advice 
for claimants 
Industrial Tribunals, re-named employment tribunals by the Employment Rights 
(Dispute Resolution) Act in 1998, were created in 1964 under the Industrial 
Training Act s.12, to provide a forum for resolving disputes between employers 
and employees, namely at that time, disputes concerning the payment of the 
Industrial Training Levy. Under the Industrial Relations Act 1971, their 
jurisdiction broadened to include unfair dismissal claims and since then they 
hear claims on all aspects of employment legislation which now includes eighty 
different areas of law.  They are independent judicial bodies which aim to 
provide quick, cheap, speedy access to justice with little formality.  
The continual introduction of new legislation regulating the employment 
relationship has given rise to an inevitable increase in the number of 
employment disputes and the number of claims being made to employment 
tribunals. Hawes (2000) indicates that the number of employment tribunal 
claims doubled in the 1990s.  More recent data suggests that there were 
197,365 claims in 2003/04, a 17 per cent increase on the previous year (ETS, 
2004). This rise can be partially accounted for by the growth in the number of 
multiple claimant cases i.e. those involving more than one claimant, and the 
publicity and greater awareness generated by landmark cases such as 
Thompson v Department of Work & Pensions, a case which may, in part, 
account for the 76 per cent increase in the number of sex discrimination cases 
registered (IDS 2004). 
This rise comes at a time when individuals are more aware of their rights and 
their employer’s obligations. The recent incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights into UK law (Human Rights Act 1998) and the 
publicity created by high profile equality and discrimination cases reaching the 
European Court of Justice have impacted on this awareness.  Additionally, the 
rising number of legal representatives marketing their legal advice under ‘no 
win no fee’ arrangements may have resulted in a more attractive alternative 
than the traditionally hourly fee paying arrangements, under the ‘nothing to 
lose’ concept.  Consequently, it is not difficult to recognise that the original 
Industrial Tribunal System has been stretched to the hilt in terms of volume of 
cases heard and levels of professional expertise required to achieve fair 
settlement. Moreover, as judicial bodies, employment tribunals have been 
expected to adhere to the principles of natural justice, which has inevitably 
introduced a degree of procedural formality normally associated with the 
ordinary civil courts.  This coupled with the fact that employment legislation has 
increased in scope and complexity has meant that more individuals require 
legal advice and representation.   
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Further, there are a number of labour market issues, which have been 
identified as contributory factors in the increase in workload of employment 
tribunals (ETs). According to some authors the UK has the least protective 
employment legislation of all the EU countries (Slinger 2001). Historically in the 
UK a system of voluntarism combined with collective bargaining covered most 
aspects of employment.  The introduction of increased legislation in the 
employment arena alongside the long-term decline in trade union membership 
(though stabilising in recent years) has enabled the development of an 
individualised approach to enforcement of employment rights, which results in 
individual workers pursuing claims against their employers (Knight and Latreille 
2000; Burgess et al. 1999). The role trade union representatives play in 
assisting in negotiating a solution to an individual’s employment disputes within 
the workplace should not be overlooked (Dickens 2002). She suggests that this 
view is supported by the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 
1998 data. For workplaces with more than twenty five employees the data 
indicated that there was a relationship between the increase in the rate of ET 
claims and an increase in the number of firms that had no union recognition 
(Cully et al. 1999). As the jurisdictions have grown, so more and more workers 
are covered by protective employment legislation. Alongside this are changes 
in the structure of the economy and composition of the labour force. Burgess et 
al. (1999) cite a correlation between claim growth and a rise in female 
participation in the labour market. They also suggest that the growth in the 
number of small enterprises, the majority of which are non-unionised, is 
significant, hence workplace characteristics play a part in contributing to the 
increase in claims.  
The generally heightened awareness of employment rights has not resulted in 
all potential claimants resorting to law. Meager et al’s. (2002) research into 
awareness, knowledge and exercise of individual rights indicated that the 
majority of respondents who had experienced problems with their rights at 
work took no action, only 5.8 per cent of their sample made a claim to the 
employment tribunal.  
There is some evidence to suggest that the size and type of the employing 
organization is a factor in determining whether or not an aggrieved employee 
will resort to law. Dickens (2002) posits that ‘small non unionised service sector 
employees are most likely to generate tribunal claims across a range of 
jurisdictions.’  She also notes that more than fifty per cent of tribunal claims are 
brought against firms with less than twenty five workers. 
The current funding arrangements for employment tribunal cases have resulted 
from legislative changes, in particular, the Access to Justice Act 1999, which 
replaced the Legal Aid system in England and Wales with two schemes, ‘Legal 
Help’ and ‘Help at Court’, both administered by the new Legal Services 
Commission.  Legal Help provides initial advice and assistance with any legal 
problems, and Help at Court allows for representation at certain court hearings. 
Legal Aid as such has never been available for employment tribunal cases at 
first instance, but was available for appeals. Legal Help, which mirrors Legal 
Aid, is likewise only available in appeal cases.  Some solicitors and other 
bodies may give limited free advice to those with low disposable incomes as 
pro-bono work, or in special cases, Legal Help (although not for actual 
representation) through the Community Legal Service, the generic title given to 
The Legal Services Commission.  
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The Community Legal Service (CLS) have developed a network of Legal Help 
through Citizen’s Advice Bureaux (CABx) and Law Centres. Information on this 
network has been publicised through public library information centres and a 
website.  In 2004 there are 496 CABx in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
In 2003 the CAB helped people with 510,000 employment related problems 
(CAB 2004). The Law Centres Federation has encouraged the development of 
publicly funded legal services for the most disadvantaged in society and 
promotes the Law Centre model as the best way of achieving this. Additionally, 
the CLS, having recognised the importance of quality legal assistance, lists 
selected lawyers and advice centres with a Quality Mark, as a guide to 
standards for the general public.   
Employees who are members of a trade union also have access to legal help 
and advice through their union.  Some unions offer a 24-hour helpline, and can 
advise on the merits of particular cases. In 2004 there are 67 unions with a 
collective total of some seven million members, representing one quarter of the 
working population. Additionally, the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), 
the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), and the Disability Rights 
Commission (DRC) may assist in the funding of a case where appropriate. 
Failing this the Free Representation Unit (FRU), which is a charity, provides 
free representation in the Greater London Area. It acts as a second-tier referral 
agency for clients from CABx, Law Centres or solicitors, as advice cannot be 
given to the public directly.  FRU has grown steadily with workloads doubling 
over the past twenty years.  In 2004 approximately 1,500 clients were referred 
to the Unit, and around 66 per cent of these are represented.  
There are also a large number of employment law consultants who operate ‘no 
win, no fee’ arrangements alongside more traditional fee arrangements. Many 
of these consultants have targeted their marketing directly at employment 
tribunal claimants and respondents as soon as their cases are registered. 
(before the public register of claims was closed in October 2004).  These 
consultants are not regulated and may not always be legally qualified.  In 
addition media reports usually only cover a few very high profile ET cases, 
which has led to a widespread but erroneous perception that financial awards 
at employment tribunal are usually substantial. The Government acknowledged 
the problem of the volume of direct marketing targeting both claimants and 
respondents when it stopped publishing the Public Register of tribunal claims 
citing, amongst other reasons, the sheer volume of consultants approaching 
both parties (IDS 2004b). 
The Bar Pro Bono Unit and the Solicitors Pro Bono Unit also offer free 
employment law advice in cases where Legal Help is not available, or the 
clamant is unable to afford legal assistance.   Overall, however, there is little 
financial help available for those involved in employment disputes.  
Legal practitioners have developed different forms of fee charging in order to 
allow litigants with little financial backing access to legal advice and justice. 
Clearly, charging an hourly fee for legal advice does provide the least risky 
alternative for practitioners; lawyers rarely lose out on such arrangements. 
However, as such rates can be very high, averaging £125 to £150 per hour, it 
would be very easy for claimants to quickly run up heavy costs.  Consequently, 
conditional fees and contingent fees, generically called ‘no win no fee’, have 
developed, linking the fees charged to the forecasted outcome of the case. 
Historically, both schemes were deemed unlawful, under the old crime of 
champerty. Taking a share of the spoils of litigation was contrary to public 
4 
policy, as lawyers may be tempted for their own personal gain ‘to inflame the 
damages, to suppress evidence, or even suborn witnesses’ (Re Trepca Mines 
Limited 1963). It has been suggested that the rationale for such reasoning in 
medieval times was sound, as ‘the mechanisms of justice lacked the internal 
strength to resist the oppression of private individuals through suits fomented 
and sustained by unscrupulous men of power (Giles v Thompson, 1994). This 
view, however, is considered by some to be out of date and no longer stands 
up to scrutiny.  Moreover the crime of champerty was abolished under the 
Criminal Law Act 1967, and the Thatcher government legitimised conditional 
fees under the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. This was part of a 
commitment to reform of the legal profession and the shift to free competition 
and choice. 
The aim and rationale behind such a scheme is to create broader access to 
justice, and potentially may provide an increase in the workloads of 
practitioners.  Recent evidence in a Law Society (2003) survey suggests that 
fee income in the area of employment has increased by an average of 69 per 
cent for private practice firms.  
Under conditional fee arrangements, a client who wins his or her case will have 
to pay their lawyer’s professional fees and, in addition, a success fee which is 
calculated as a percentage of professional fees. This can be up to 100 per 
cent, although research from a survey of 121 firms has shown that the average 
level is around 43 per cent (Yarrow 1998). Conversely, if the client loses his or 
her case, he or she may have to pay the winning side’s costs, including the 
uplift on the success fee charged by the successful party’s lawyers’ fees, and 
any insurance premiums paid out by the winner.  However, there would be no 
professional fee charged by the lawyer.  Conditional fee arrangements are 
hardly used in employment cases as costs are rarely awarded although they 
can be used as a penal sanction for vexatious litigants (McPherson v BNP 
Paribas 2004). Instead, contingent (or contingency) fee arrangements have 
developed.  These can also be described as ‘no win no fee’, and as stated by 
Underwood ‘for all practical purposes there is no difference between 
conditional fee arrangements and contingent fees except for the way they are 
spelt’ (Underwood, 1999). Both schemes result in the client only paying a fee if 
he or she wins. The fee is either contingent or conditional upon the result. 
Under a new Rule 8(1) of The Solicitor’s Practice Rules 1990, adopted in 1999, 
‘A solicitor who is retained or employed to prosecute or defend any action, suit 
or other contentious proceeding shall not enter into any arrangement to receive 
a contingent fee in respect of that proceeding, save one permitted under 
statute or by the common law’ (Law Society Gazette 1996). As employment 
disputes are deemed non-contentious, employment lawyers have been able to 
interpret this rule literally, and thus legitimately operate on a contingent fee 
basis. Moreover, those offering legal advice who are not qualified solicitors are 
free to make their own arrangements for fee charging.  
In contingent fee arrangements, the client is charged a percentage of the 
damages awarded. This is agreed between the legal representative and the 
client before representation and may vary.  The concept of lawyers having to 
share the financial consequences of their judgements, rather than simply 
charging hourly rates, which offers greater rewards to the least efficient 
providers, has been recognised as being advantageous to the client. However, 
previous research has shown that claimants will only be represented if two 
conditions are met.  Firstly, the legal representative needs to believe that the 
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chance of success is good.  Secondly, the likely award will need to be in the 
region of £12,000 - £15,000 (Johnson and Hammersley, 2005). Smaller claims, 
although often of merit, fall by the wayside and thus access to justice may be 
limited. 
Contingent fees are simple to explain to a client, as they are based on a 
proportion of the award granted, and there is less likelihood of lawyers padding 
out their costs to earn a higher success fee as in conditional fee arrangements 
(Zander 2003).  Additionally, the client enjoys several advantages.  For 
example, there will be no anxieties about having to pay large legal fees, and no 
requirement to pay before a case is heard. Also, the lawyer is deemed to be 
taking the risk and in most cases should have carefully assessed the chances 
of winning.  As costs are not usually awarded in employment tribunals, there 
are no fears of the client having to meet such payments and thus the notion of 
‘no win no fee’ is clear. 
One evident concern to policy makers is the influence of contingent fee 
arrangements on the experience and outcome of employment tribunal claims, 
as well as their influence on the actual number of claims being made.  The 
Survey of Employment Tribunal Applications (SETA) 2003 did ask claimants 
about their use of contingent fee arrangements and so can be analysed to 
shed light on the outcomes of claimants using contingent fee arrangements.  
Unfortunately survey data cannot help us to explore the counterfactual 
position, how many people would have made a claim to an employment 
tribunal even if contingent fee arrangements did not exist. 
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2 
Methodology 
The method of investigation adopted for this report was a form of simple 
investigator triangulation. In the first stage two of the researchers (Hammersley 
and Johnson) undertook literature reviews of the prevalence of ‘no win no fee’ 
arrangements in employment tribunal cases. These reviews were undertaken 
from the perspectives of a human resource management specialist 
(Hammersley) and an employment lawyer (Johnson). This review forms the 
basis of Chapter 1 of this report. Independently the third researcher (Morris) 
undertook an exploratory analysis of the SETA 2003 data to identify statistical 
relationships from the data which could be worthy of further discussion. 
Regular discussions took place once the initial work was complete to identify 
areas of commonality and difference in so as to agree where additional 
research effort should be directed. 
This approach has a number of advantages as a working methodology 
including the potential to reduce the bias inherent in adopting a particular 
discipline-based approach and greater face validity. However it is not a 
particularly helpful structure for reporting our findings and we do not follow it 
here. 
Chapter 3 sets out the results from an exploration of the SETA 2003 survey 
data. 
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Choice of representation 
The SETA 2003 dataset includes a large number of variables about claimant 
choices of advice, guidance and representation throughout the duration of an 
employment tribunal claim. However the narrative format chosen for the survey 
(that is questions were asked in the order in which ‘critical incidents’ occurred 
in the process) only permits limited analysis of the continuity of advice. It is not 
possible from the survey to identify the particular routes by which claimants 
arrived at different types of representation. In particular we cannot identify from 
SETA 2003 how or why particular claimants chose contingent fee 
arrangements as opposed to other types of representation.  SETA 
concentrated on the ‘facts’ of representation rather than exploring the reasons 
why particular forms were chosen over other possible alternatives. 
Figure 1 shows the pattern of choices for claimants once a claim has been 
submitted.  Prior to completing the ET1 claim form SETA asks for information 
about all sources of help and information used without any prioritisation. At the 
stage where the claim form (ET1) is being completed, that is when a decision 
has been made to proceed with an employment tribunal claim, claimants are 
asked to identify single guiding representatives dealing with the day-to-da 
activities relating to the claim, or to identify a ‘main advisor’ where no 
representative is identified.  Claimants are later asked to identify other sources 
of advice and guidance other than their representative or main advisor (which 
can be multiple).  The reason for this approach in SETA 2003 was to identify 
the most important source of advice and representation at key stages in the 
claimant’s case.  However this approach may lose information on the full range 
and hierarchy of advice to claimants during the case. 
Why opt for contingent fees? 
In overall terms there are three sets of influences on the type of representation 
chosen. Firstly there are claimants’ choices. Secondly there are the options 
which legal advisers are willing to offer. Thirdly there is the type of case 
involved. We also need to remember that self-representation is an option for 
claimants. Indeed this route is frequently chosen. In the SETA sample 35% of 
claimants chose this route (see Figure 1 below). 
Claimants’ choices 
Claimants’ choices of whether or not to adopt a contingent fees approach will 
be a combination of push and pull factors.  However overall there are three 
broad possibilities.  Firstly claimants may be pushed into contingent fee 
arrangements by lack of cheaper or free (in the sense of zero priced at the 
point of use) alternatives, for example, availability of legal expenses insurance 
or trade union support. 
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Secondly contingent fees may be chosen for economic reasons. This 
motivation only comes into play if the claimant does not have legal expenses 
insurance or membership of some organization which will provide free legal (or 
other acceptable) support, for example a trade union or professional 
association. However in the absence of such insurance the relative price of 
alternative sources of advice and representation is likely to be a factor in 
claimants’ choice. The perceived quality of the service is also relevant. Under 
the ‘hedonic’ principle claimants may assume a positive association between 
quality and price. However it is clearly difficult for claimants to observe or 
assess ‘quality’ directly and proxy measures might be used such as reputation 
or the adviser’s estimation of the chance of winning.  The assumption that 
claimants are motivated in economic ways, that is, they act as economically 
rational individuals, is obviously a very strong one.  However there is reason to 
suspect that an assumption of economic rationality may be unlikely given some 
of the motivations reported by respondents for undertaking employment 
tribunal cases – such as seeking justice or simply having their day in court to 
‘name and shame’ their former employer. There is also the assumption that 
claimants have full knowledge of all the alternative means of funding their 
actions.  Assuming we do operate under rational economic assumptions then 
the key variables which will be involved in the decision over choice of 
representation are as follows:  
• relative price, that is the level of fees plus any other costs involved in the 
action 
• probability of winning  
• estimated probable award in the event of winning 
• claimant's ability to pay which will, in part, depend on income 
• claimant's attitudes towards risk.   
Contingent fee arrangements shift financial risk from claimants to advisors.  
Clearly advisers will want to charge for taking on this risk.  However this shift in 
risk, even at a positive price, may be in the interests of both parties.  The legal 
advisers may be willing to take on the additional risk in individual cases 
because they can add them to the portfolio of other cases and the associated 
risks which they are already carrying.  It is a fundamental feature of risk 
management that a portfolio of risks will have less overall risk than the simple 
sum of the risks associated with the individual elements of a portfolio.  For the 
claimant this will probably be their only case and therefore they have to 
shoulder all the risk. In short claimants might find it in their economic interests 
to shift the risk associated with losing the case to someone else who is better 
equipped to mange the risk. This is exactly the same principle as is involved in 
taking out legal expenses insurance. Claimants opting for contingent fee 
arrangements paid £3,020 on average for advice and representation. 
Claimants who used legal advisers but did not opt for contingent fees paid an 
average of £2,243. However we must be wary of attributing the difference in 
payments (£777) simply to the risk premium charged by advisers. It may be 
that the characteristics of the cases dealt with under different fee arrangements 
may not be the same. For example claimants might wish to opt for contingent 
fees in more risky, complex or ‘high stakes’ cases.  
 Did you complete the claim form yourself? 
YES = 1151 No = 1,046
Did you nominate a 
representative? 
YES = 274 No = 775 
Who?
• Work colleague=13 
• TU representative =236 
• CABx = 106 
• Employment Rights 
Advisor = 25 
• Lawyer = 410 
• Family friend = 61 
• Other = 39 
Did they nominate a 
representative for you? 
No = 228 YES = 630 
Self = 563 Other = 61 
Also Day to Day representative
• TU representative =151 
• CABx = 45 
• Lawyer = 132 
• Family friend = 14 
Source of help
• Work colleague=7 
• TU representative =169 
• CABx = 177 
• Employment Rights 
Advisor = 21 
• Lawyer = 469 
• Family / friend = 157 
• Acas = 8 
• CRE = 10 
• EOC = 2 
• Other = 22 
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Source: SETA 2003. N = 
Figure 1: Representation routes, submission of claim form 
2,236 claimant interviews  
Notes: “Don’t know” not included in counts. 
Thirdly claimants may end up in contingent fee arrangements purely on the 
basis of opportunism.  This can arise because claimants may be ‘cold-called’ 
by lawyers, employment rights advisers or others with offers based on some 
form of contingent fees.  
Advisers’ choices 
Claimants may not always be able to access their preferred choice of advice 
and representation. Of the 581 claimants (out of the 2,236 claimants 
interviewed) who said that they desired additional sources of advice in 
handling their cases 11% (64) said that they had been refused help from their 
preferred additional source. Obviously free services will be the favoured in 
many cases. However in some cases the price of ‘financial freedom’ may be 
lack of individual choice.  For example the legal insurer or trade union may 
appoint the representative rather than the claimant and reserve the right to 
withdraw the service if, in their view, a settlement is a sensible ‘commercial’ 
decision. The claimant may be willing to trade off this lack of choice for the 
lower price of advice and representation.  However, many claimants receive 
some free services (often free advice during the early stages of the ET 
process) but pay for others (typically representation). Of the 1,389 claimants 
in the survey who had a day-to-representative (out of 2,236 in total), 9% (125) 
paid for part of the advice and representation received. Thus there may be 
both claimants who would have preferred a contingent fee arrangement but 
were not offered one and, on the other hand, claimants who opted for 
contingent fees out of necessity. SETA does not provide any data from which 
inferences on these two competing tendencies may be drawn. 
The likely variables influencing legal advisers in offering contingent fee 
arrangements to clients are: 
• the potential earnings from the case  
• the chances of settling or winning the case 
• the risks associated with the case 
• the complexity of the case 
• non-financial costs and benefits such as influences on reputation 
• altruism (or desire to be seen to be altruistic via pro bono work) 
Given that there are significant fixed costs associated with any ET case 
contingent fees may not be offered in low financial value cases since the 
percentage of the potential settlement asked for may be very high. Law 
Society guidance to its members suggests that a contingent fee of one third 
of the settlement is often appropriate. Similarly if the adviser estimates the 
chances of winning or reaching a satisfactory settlement to be low then a 
higher risk premium will be sought. 
We also note that there is a significant (mainly US literature) which suggests 
that lawyer moral hazard is a feature of simple (non-contingent) fee 
structures. Moral hazard is the risk that the presence of a contract will affect 
the behaviour of one or more parties. The classic example is in the insurance 
industry, where coverage against a loss might increase the risk-taking 
behaviour of the insured. In the non-contingent fee structure the lawyer has 
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an incentive to maximize his fees by doing more work, whether or not this will 
increase the client’s net wealth (in the sense of any financial settlement 
reached less the lawyer’s fees). Contingent fees align the economic interests 
of the client and lawyer in that both are interested in maximizing any financial 
award made. Whilst this literature refers mainly to personal injury and medical 
negligence cases it may generalize to other contingent fee situations. If so we 
might expect more satisfactory outcomes for claimants than might otherwise 
be the case. 
Case characteristics 
Attitudes towards and perceptions of risk may influence the types of cases 
which are acceptable to claimants (clients) and advisers (lawyers) in cases 
where contingent fees are adopted. Case complexity and jurisdiction might be 
influences here. We have discussed attitudes towards risk above. However 
there may be differences in perceptions of risk between claimants and 
solicitors which relate to the nature of the case. It is not obvious what these 
variables are but jurisdiction and complexity (in a legal sense) are two 
potential factors. The circumstances in which claimants left their employment 
might also be relevant. For example: Did they walk out? Did they discuss the 
matter with employer before they left? Did the employer have procedures for 
dealing with grievance issues? Figure 2 summarises the overall influences on 
the choice of contingent fees. 
 
Figure 2: Influences on choice of contingent fee arrangements 
Claimant 
• Expected cost of advice 
• Other costs 
• Likely settlement level 
• Probability of winning 
• Ability to pay 
Legal Advisor
• Expected costs 
• Likely fees 
• Probability of winning 
• Complexity 
• Non-financial issues 
Contingent Fee 
Case characteristics
• Complexity 
• Jurisdictions 
 
Identifying contingent fee payers 
There are a number of difficulties in identifying claimants who use contingent 
fee arrangements from the survey.  The findings from the survey (Hayward et 
al: 40)  identify contingent fee arrangements as ones in which if a case is 
won, including by a settlement of being reached before going to tribunal, the 
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solicitor receives a pre-agreed proportion of the settlement or award.  This 
can come in two parts, firstly a fee and secondly repayment of 
disbursements, although arrangements do vary.  Even if the successful 
claimant pays no fees they may still be liable to pay the legal representative’s 
disbursements.  This can give rise to confusion in answering questions about 
contingent fee arrangements since the respondent may not make any 
distinction between fees per se and disbursements.  This means that 
respondents can answer that they do have to pay something to legal advisers 
even if the case is won even though the case is being funded on a contingent 
fee basis. 
Difficulties arise however in interpreting answers to questions where 
contingent fee arrangements are concerned.  Firstly the questions make no 
mention of disbursements as opposed to fees and simply use the term ‘fee’ to 
imply any payments made by claimants to solicitors.  Secondly question E13 
and the follow-up questions are confusing.  Question E13 asks ‘Did you have 
an arrangement with any legal adviser(s) by which you would have to pay 
their bill if you won the case?’   There is confusion because the words ‘fee’ 
and ‘bill’ are being used interchangeably; however the bill presumably 
includes both fees and disbursements.  Claimants may well not be able to 
distinguish meaningfully between a fee and a disbursement and in the context 
of a long telephone interview it would have been very difficult to explore the 
exact nature of payments made for legal advice or representation – especially 
given the recall issues involved with the SETA interview being conducted up 
to 18 months or so after the claim was promulgated. 
If the respondents answered ‘yes’ to E13 then a further question was asked 
to identify one of three possibilities. The first possibility is ‘Yes - paid only if 
won’ implying that any fee or bill would only be paid if the case was won and 
nothing would be paid if the case was lost. In fact even under contingent or 
conditional fee arrangements successful claimants could end up paying 
something, win or lose, because they would still be required to pay the 
disbursements. Indeed answers to another question (N4) asking for the total 
amount paid personally by claimants for advice and representation in the 
case showed that 89 respondents paid something for advice and 
representation but also said that they had a contingent fee arrangement with 
a legal adviser such that they paid (the bill) only if they won. It is possible, of 
course, that claimants paid for some advice before reaching a contingent fee 
arrangement with a legal adviser. These payments could have been made to 
the ultimate adviser or someone else. However it is not possible to identify 
whether or not this is the case from the survey evidence.  Again collecting 
detailed information on the nature of all payments to all advisors involved in a 
case was beyond the ability of the SETA telephone interview. 
The second alternative offered in question E13 could cause even greater 
confusion. This alternative was ‘Yes – paid if won or lost’. Claimants were not 
asked to identify whether if what they paid if they lost the case was only a 
proportion of the solicitor's fees, none of the solicitor's fees or simply any 
disbursements. The questionnaire however interprets both answers (Yes - 
paid only if won and Yes - paid if won or lost) as being evidence of contingent 
fee arrangements. 
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Table 1. Crosstabulation of contingent fee payers and paying for help and advice. 
 Whether had contingent fee arrangement with  
any legal adviser(s) 
 
  Don't know Yes - paid 
only if won 
Yes - paid if 
won or lost 
No 
arrangement 
Total 
(n) 
  N N N N N 
Don't know 1 2 0 7 10 
Paid for all 11 64 120 151 346 
Paid for some 2 25 23 81 131 
Whether had to 
pay for all help 
or advice 
All free 15 51 16 820 902 
Total 29 142 159 1059 1389 
Source: SETA 2003, N= 2,239 claimants 
Table 1 shows answers to question E13 (‘Whether had contingent fee 
arrangement with any legal adviser’) in the columns and answers to question 
E12 (whether had to pay for all or part of the help and advice received) in the 
rows.  
Table 2 shows claimants’ responses to a question asking if they received any 
free advice from lawyers cross-tabulated with answers to question E13 
(‘Whether had contingent fee arrangement with any legal adviser’).  The data 
in this table is difficult to interpret but does suggest that there could be some 
confusion in possibility is to restrict analysis to the ‘Yes-paid only if won’ 
category since this could be supposed to correspond to ‘no win, no fee’ 
arrangements.  However it is also quite clear that the claimant may have 
received free legal advice before submitting a claim or a free consultation 
session with a lawyer before committing to a contingent fee arrangement with 
the same or different legal advisor.  The possibility of claimants having more 
than one legal advisor and having different payment arrangements with 
different advisors at different times was left open in the SETA interview.  The 
researchers focused upon whether claimants had received free advice at any 
time and whether or not they had entered some kind of contingent fee 
arrangement at ay time.   
Table 2. Crosstabulation of contingent fee payers and provision of free advice 
by lawyers.  
  Whether had contingent fee arrangement with any legal 
adviser(s) 
 
   Don't know Yes - paid 
only if won 
Yes - paid if 
won or lost 
No 
arrangement 
Total 
No 9 20 22 623 674 Did a solicitor, barrister 
or some other kind of 
lawyer provide free 
help or advice?  
  
Yes 8 56 17 278 359 
Total  17 76 39 901 1033 
Source: SETA 2003 
TThe analysis reported here assumes that respondents who answered ‘Yes – 
paid only if won’ or ‘Yes – paid if won or lost’ in response to the question 
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about contingent fee arrangements did have a contingent fee arrangement 
with their legal advisers at some point during the claim. However we will pay 
especial attention to the first category of respondents. The questions eliciting 
information on fee arrangements with legal advisers should be reviewed to 
establish whether or not they are effective in obtaining the information 
required. 
Results 
Tables 3, 6 and 7 below summarise the results of cross-tabulations linking the 
issues in column 1 to whether or not claimants represented by a legal adviser 
had a contingent fee arrangement or not. Comparisons between claimants 
with contingent fee arrangements and those represented/advised by non-
legal advisers (for example trade union representatives) are not reported. 
Column 2 reports whether or not the comparisons yielded significant 
statistical differences at the 5% significance level (that is there is a less than 
5% chance that the observed pattern of responses could have occurred by 
chance). Note that the terms ‘yes’ and ‘no’ do not indicate levels of responses 
but only relative levels. For example in row 1 the analysis suggests that there 
is no statistical difference in the patterns of responses to the question asking 
claimants if they were motivated to make a claim by monetary concerns 
between those with contingent fee arrangements and those without. However 
overall most claimants did say that money was important to them. Similarly, 
overall, claimants were satisfied with the advice and representation they 
received from legal advisers (as indicated by the questions relating to the last 
two rows of Table 4a), the ‘no’ in column 2 indicates that there is no statistical 
difference in the levels of satisfaction expressed between those on contingent 
fee arrangements and those who did not have such an arrangement. (The 
criterion for recording a ‘yes’ in column 2 is that both the Pearson chi-squared 
test statistic  and the Likelihood Ratio should be less that .05.) 
Column 3 indicates the direction of the statistical relationship. As always we 
must be wary of imputing causality here. For example the statistical 
observation that managers are more likely to have contingent fee 
arrangement with legal advisers may have nothing to do with being a 
management role per se but may be related to the higher incomes that 
managers enjoy and/or the greater amounts of money involved in cases 
where a manager is an claimant. Thus being a manager may be a proxy for 
other economic variables. Similarly column 3 tells us nothing about the 
interaction between variables; we cannot simply take all the ‘yes’ directional 
characteristics and interpret them as a typical profile of a contingent fee 
claimant. 
Table 3 shows results for claimants. These indicate that there may be some 
push factors here in that claimants who were covered by legal expenses 
insurance and/or members of a trade union were less likely have contingent 
fee arrangements. Given that in these cases the provider of the ‘free’ advice 
and representation will be the ultimate bill payer it is likely that fee 
arrangements will be made by them. 
Economic factors also play a part. Although contingent fee paying claimants, 
when asked if their decision to enter into the Tribunal process, were no more 
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likely than others to say that they were motivated by money they were 
involved in higher financial value cases and were more likely to be seeking 
compensation. This finding ties in with contingent fee payers having higher 
salaries on average and more likely to be managers. Unfair dismissal cases 
also tend to involve higher settlements than cases under other jurisdictions. 
For example 33% of all unfair dismissal cases in the SETA sample resulted in 
settlements over £5,000 compared to 20% of other cases. However this 
pattern was not repeated for cases decided at Tribunal; here the 
corresponding figures are 33% for unfair dismissal cases and 42% for all 
others. Note however that over three times as many cases are settled than go 
to a Tribunal hearing but there is no tendency for unfair dismissal cases to be 
settled (rather than decided at a Tribunal hearing) compared to others. 
Where outcomes are concerned contingent fee cases are more likely to be 
settled than those where a legal adviser was employed as the claimant’s 
representative under a normal fee paying arrangement. Table 4 summarises 
outcomes from settled cases. 
Compared to all cases in the SETA sample those involving contingent fees 
were less likely to be ACAS conciliated but twice as likely to be privately 
settled. Large settlements (those over £5,000) were also a feature of 
contingent fee cases. 
Claimants entering into contingent fee arrangements do not seem to be 
responding to cold-calling by persons offering legal representation services 
when compared to those entering other arrangements with lawyers. Similarly 
claimants who are advised, guided and/or represented by lawyers are no 
more likely to have been cold-called that those using other forms of help. 
Table 5 gives some more data on sources of advice used. 
Compared to all cases in the SETA sample those involving contingent fees 
were less likely to be ACAS conciliated but twice as likely to be privately 
settled. Large settlements (those over £5,000) were also a feature of 
contingent fee cases. 
Claimants entering into contingent fee arrangements do not seem to be 
responding to cold-calling by persons offering legal representation services 
when compared to those entering other arrangements with lawyers. Similarly 
claimants who are advised, guided and/or represented by lawyers are no 
more likely to have been cold-called that those using other forms of help. 
Table 5 gives some more data on sources of advice used. 
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Table 3: Results of Crosstabulations for Claimant Characteristics 
Issue Significant: 
Yes or No? 
Direction 
1. Was the claimant motivated by money? No  
2. Was the claimant hoping to get money owed and/or 
compensation? 
Yes Claimants with contingent fee 
arrangements were more likely to want 
compensation. 
3. Amount of money involved in case Yes Contingent fee arrangements more likely 
in higher value cases (above £5000) 
4. Was the claimant dismissed? Yes Claimants opting for contingent fees 
were more likely to have been 
dismissed. 
5. How well informed was claimant prior to case? No  
6. How well informed did the claimant feel about what 
the Tribunal might award if they won their case? 
No  
7. Whether claimants thought it was right to involve their 
main advisers in the case 
No  
8. How satisfied was the claimant with the outcome of 
the case? 
No  
9. Advice on chances of winning at a hearing Yes Claimants with contingent fee 
arrangements were more likely to be 
advised that they were likely to win. 
10. Was claimant a member of a trade union or staff 
association? 
Yes Claimants who were members of a trade 
union unlikely to have contingent fee 
arrangements 
11. Did claimant have legal expenses insurance? Yes Claimants covered by legal expenses 
insurance or similar arrangement 
unlikely to have contingent fee 
arrangements 
12. Was the claimant ‘cold-called’ with offers of 
unsolicited legal advice? 
No  
13. Gender of claimant No  
14. Was claimant employed in the public or private 
sector? 
No  
15. Claimant’s age No  
16. Did claimant have managerial/supervisory duties? Yes Managers much more likely to opt for 
contingent fees 
17. Claimant’s level of education No  
18. Claimant’s income Yes Claimants with higher salaries are more 
likely to opt for contingent fee 
arrangements 
19.Outcome of case 
 
Yes Cases where a contingent fee 
arrangement existed were more likely to 
be settled and less likely to be 
withdrawn. 
20. Would claimant advise a friend in same position to 
put in an application? 
No  
21. Did claimant feel it was worthwhile bringing 
Tribunal? 
No  
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 Table 4: Settlement in contingent fee cases 
 ACAS Settled Privately Settled All other outcomes 
Contingent Fee Payers 23% 27% 50% 
All cases 48% 14% 38% 
Settlements over £5k, 
contingent fee payers 
38% 46%  
Settlements over £5k, all 
cases 
15% 30%  
Source. SETA, 2003. 
Table 5:  Sources of Advice Used 
Sources of free 
advice 
Contingent fee/Free 
advice not given 
Contingent fee/Free 
advice given 
No contingent 
fee/Free advice not 
given 
No contingent 
fee/Free advice 
given 
TU Representative 107 8 672 229 
CABx 106 9 685 216 
ACAS Helpline 111 4 891 10 
ACAS Officer 114 1 868 33 
Employment Rights 
Adviser 
111 4 872 29 
Lawyer 42 73 623 278 
Other 116 6 812 89 
Source. SETA, 2003.   Note: The survey also included ‘Person nominated on claim form’ as a category for free advice. This has been excluded from the table since there would be overlap 
between the categories shown here. 
Lawyers are much more likely to have given claimants some free advice 
before in cases which are eventually funded through contingent fee 
arrangements than otherwise. Secondly it is clear that many claimants who 
eventually enter into contingent fee arrangements with lawyers have not had 
free advice from other sources. Claimants who eventually enter into 
contingent fee arrangements are just as likely to have been contacted by 
Acas and equally aware of their right to some free preliminary advice as 
claimants in general. 
Claimants who entered into contingent fee arrangements do not seem to be 
more or less satisfied than others. There is no statistical difference between 
stated levels of satisfaction at the early advice stages (Items 5, 6 and 9 in 
Table 4) or in post-case satisfaction (Issues 7,8, 21 and 22). 
As already noted above, it is likely that several of the variables identified in 
Table 4 may be measuring essentially the same things, for example 
claimants’ incomes or the size of the case in financial settlement terms. It 
would obviously be helpful to eliminate some of the overlap and identify the 
key variables involved. There are several widely used methods of identifying 
groups characterised by different or similar characteristics.  Cluster Analysis 
17 
is a form of multi-variable analysis which (statistically) defines clusters 
composed of relatively homogeneous groupings.  Such similarity or closeness 
within clusters is judged on the basis of the values of cases (here claimants 
employing legal advisers) for a set of variables. In this case the variables 
initially chosen are those with ‘Yes’ entries in the middle column of Table 4.  
(See Everitt, 1997 for further explanation of cluster analysis techniques; the 
technique used here is k-means analysis). Cluster Analysis is capable of 
splitting data into any number of clusters, provided there is sufficient data 
available. Normally a minimum of 200 cases is advised, a criterion which is 
met by the 301 cases in which contingent fees were used. One advantage of 
cluster analysis is that it does not require any assumptions about the 
distribution of the data and it can be used in a purely exploratory way. The 
most interesting cluster identified was one of 174 cases which shared the 
following distinguishing characteristics: 
• claimants used contingent fee arrangements 
• claimants had higher than average salaries 
• financial settlements were a the top end of the range reported in SETA 
• claimants had some higher education 
 
Table 6: Results of crosstabulations for Legal Advisor characteristics 
Issue Significant: Yes 
or No? 
Direction 
9. Advice on chances of winning at a hearing Yes Claimants with contingent fee 
arrangements were more likely to be 
advised that they were likely to win. 
22. Were claimants advised to withdraw their case? No  
23. Were claimants advised to settle? No  
3. Amount of money involved in case Yes Contingent fee arrangements more likely 
in higher value cases (above £5000) 
 
There is no evidence that legal advisers are more prone to ‘push’ for a 
settlement when they have a contingent fee arrangement with their client than 
when they have a conventional fee arrangement (Table 6). However the 
analysis of results in Table 4 does show that settlement is a more likely 
outcome when contingent fees are involved. Although claimants were more 
likely to be advised that they would probably be successful if they went to full 
Tribunal hearing outcomes suggest that this optimism might be misplaced. 
Claimants with contingent fee arrangements were successful in 48% of cases 
compared to 56% where normal fee arrangements applied and 56% of all 
cases (any representation). Note also here the tendency for contingent fee 
arrangements to be used in higher financial value cases. 
When cluster analysis was employed the only distinguishing feature of 
contingent fee cases from the point of view of legal advisers was the amount 
of money in the final settlement. 
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Table 7: Results of crosstabulations for characteristics of cases 
Issue Significant: Yes 
or No? 
Direction 
24. Whether claimant would have done better at 
Tribunal compared to accepting settlement 
Yes Claimants under contingent fee 
arrangements believe they would have 
done better going to Tribunal. 
25. Did employer have written grievance procedure? No  
26. Were written procedures followed before ET 
application? 
No  
27. Did employer have written disciplinary procedure? No  
28. Did the claimant resign from or walk out on their 
job? 
No  
29. Was the workplace small in employment terms 
(less than 50 employees)? 
No  
30. Jurisdiction Yes Contingent fee arrangements more likely 
in unfair dismissal cases; less likely in 
‘fast track’ cases, more likely in standard 
period conciliation cases. 
 
Interestingly, claimants in contingent fee arrangements who settled their 
cases or who where an offer of settlement was made and rejected were more 
likely to believe they would have received a more favourable outcome to their 
case by going to a Tribunal hearing rather than settling their claim with the 
employer.  
There is no statistical evidence to support the idea that contingent fee 
arrangements are more likely to occur in cases where employers have less 
formalized and/or legally compliant personnel procedures (Issues 25, 26, 27 
and 29). Nor do the circumstances under which claimants left their jobs 
statistically relevant unless they were dismissed. 
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4 
Conclusions  
This research has explored the growing phenomenon of ‘no win no fee’ 
arrangements in employment tribunal cases.  This growth has been 
accompanied by concerns.  On the one hand there have been worries about 
whether or not legal advisers will behave in the same way as they would 
under normal fee arrangements. For example will there be a tendency for 
them to advise clients to settle rather than opt for a full Tribunal hearing. 
There is also concern about whether or not claimants will pursue claims in 
situations where they would not normally do so.  On the other hand ‘no win no 
fee’ arrangements extend access to justice.  There is therefore a balance to 
be struck between potential detrimental effects of ‘no win no fee’ 
arrangements and the benefits for those who use them in situations where 
they might not otherwise be able to pursue legitimate claims. 
A priori there are three sets of factors which would influence the choice of ‘no 
win no fee’ arrangements.  Firstly there are factors which are relevant to 
claimants.  Whilst SETA data clearly confirms that the reasons why claimants 
bring employment tribunal cases are not simply economic ones, that is there 
are motivations other than money involved, it may well be that once a 
decision has been made to pursue a claim then the way in which it is pursued 
will be mainly an economic decision.  If this is the case then the factors which 
affect claimants will be their income, their attitude towards risk and the 
expected value of any settlement or award they might get.  It is quite likely 
that claimants may choose to opt for contingent fee arrangements in 
situations where there is both high risk and potentially higher rewards but also 
the possibility of higher losses.   
Where legal advisers are concerned it is likely that ‘no win no fee’ 
arrangements would be offered in situations where there is a potential for 
substantial awards to be made.  This both reduces the risk that any 
proportion of fees retained by a legal adviser would not cover their costs and 
also, again, is part of the high risk high reward trade-off.  Other factors which 
may influence their choices in this situation are the potential for winning the 
case and the possible complexity of pursuing the case.  Given that any 
employment tribunal case has substantial fixed costs associated with its 
pursuit, it is quite likely that legal advisers will only offer ‘no win no fee’ 
arrangements when there is a potential for high value awards being made.  
Finally there are factors which are linked to the type of case itself.  Again 
complexity, riskiness and potential economic value of any award will be 
factors. 
Our results confirm that ‘no win no fee’ arrangements extend access to justice 
for those who do not have other opportunities to fund their cases without risk 
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of loss to themselves. For example contingent fee cases are much more 
common where claimants have no access to trade union representation or do 
not possess any legal insurance.  On the other hand contingent fee cases are 
most commonly used by better off claimants in high value cases.  Contingent 
fee users also tend to be better educated than other claimants in addition to 
any effects that education they have on income. 
There is also a tendency for contingent fee cases to be settled rather than 
pursued to Tribunal hearing.  The level of settlements tends to be higher but 
this is because high value cases are being pursued.  Paradoxically claimants 
whose cases do go to hearing do less well than claimants who do not have 
contingent fee arrangements.  This is contrary to the opinions of claimants 
who settled their claims or where an offer of settlement was made by an 
employer – where those involved in contingent fee cases were more inclined 
to believe they would do better through a Tribunal hearing. 
However claimants are generally satisfied with the outcomes of cases with 
‘no win no fee’ arrangements.  They are satisfied with the process, advice 
given and outcomes. There is no statistical difference between the levels of 
satisfaction at any stage of pursuit of employment tribunal claims between 
claimants with contingent fee arrangements and those with any other form of 
representation.  It may well be, then, that concern with ‘no win no fee’ 
arrangements are misplaced. 
Further research on this topic is clearly merited.  This paper has been 
exploratory and has done little more than identify some of the key variables in 
the choice of contingent fee arrangements.  Whilst the analysis points to 
some confirmation of an economic explanation for the particular choice of 
method of pursuing employment tribunal claims rather than the motivation for 
instigating the claim in the first place, more research will be required to 
explain choices and build reliable models of claimants’ choice of 
representation.  SETA data is valuable for giving an overall picture of choice 
of representation but it needs to be extended by other means.  In particular 
in-depth interviews with claimants using contingent fee arrangements would 
be valuable.  The SETA data can be improved in at least two ways, at least 
for the purposes of understanding contingent fee arrangements.  Firstly the 
questions which relate to fee arrangements with legal advisers are too 
general to support detailed analysis of outcomes by fee arrangements.  It 
may well be that the answers to such questions do not give a reliable 
indication that contingent fee arrangements are in fact being employed by 
claimants.  Secondly the narrative style of the survey interviews does not 
allow for tracking in detail the patterns of advice through the employment 
tribunal process.  Some indication of overlap between advisers at different 
stages is given but more detail would be desirable.  It would be helpful to 
know, for example, who suggested contingent fee arrangements, when they 
were suggested and whether advisers were changed during the process.  
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